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THE MISAPPLICATION OF GARCETTI IN HIGHER
EDUCATION
Matthew Jay Hertzog*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Tenure, as currently implemented in American colleges and
universities, provides academics a high degree of job security.
However, over the past few decades, with the financial
restraints placed on public institutions due to the lack of state
and federal funding and declining enrollment in certain
disciplines, the value of tenure is being raised by university
administrators, the media, the public at large and politicians.1
These discussions on tenure primarily address faculty
productivity and accountability when institutions attempt to
remove a tenured faculty member. In addition, most colleges
and universities have some form of tenure, resulting in a two
class faculty system which may impact the faculty member’s’
academic freedom.2 Although there are various approaches to
higher education in the United States,3 the institution of higher
education has focused on protection of faculty members from
wrongful termination, or more so, termination without due
*Matthew Jay Hertzog is the Director of Educational Technology at Methodist College.
He is responsible for the management of the college’s online learning system. He also
served as an Associate Dean at Illinois Central College from 2005 – 2011. He received
his Ph.D. from Illinois State University in Higher Education Administration with an
emphasis in Educational Law.
1
Neil Gross and Solon Simmons, Americans’ Views of Political Bias in the
Academy and Academic Freedom 13–14 (Working Paper May 22, 2006),
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/DCF3EBD7-509E-47AB-9AB3FBCFFF5CA9C3/0/2006Gross.pdf (Gross and Simmons, with the help of Princeton
Survey Research Associates International in conducting the survey, found that out of a
thousand randomly questioned Americans, 80.7% believed that tenure protects
incompetent faculty. Furthermore, 57.9% surveyed believe that awarding tenure to
faculty removes incentives for hard work).
2
For the specific purpose of this article, the two class faculty system created
within higher education consists of tenured track and non-tenured track faculty.
3
For the specific purpose of this article, the various approaches of higher
education in the United States include junior colleges, private four year institutions,
research institutions and typical four-year institutions.
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process, as well as the academic freedom to discuss
controversial topics in the classroom.4 Similarly, the same
rights that are awarded to faculty through the protection of
tenure and academic freedom also provide students an
opportunity to question theories presented in their courses of
study.5
The rights and freedoms afforded by tenure and academic
freedom did not coalesce until 1915, when the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) put forth the goals
of what has become known as tenure and academic freedom.
In a document drafted by the AAUP, the goals of tenure and
academic freedom include: 1) protection of a faculty member’s
academic freedom in the classroom and 2) protection of the
faculty member’s ability to perform other job duties without the
fear of termination.6 However, with the decision reached by
the United States Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos
(2006), the Court stated that “when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties”7 the protections
afforded through the First Amendment are not available.8 This
statement set the precedent for university administration to
apply the Garcetti decision to faculty claims of violation of their
academic freedom.
II.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE TENURE AS A NATIONAL
STANDARD

Tenure as a vehicle to provide job security for faculty in
American higher education can be traced back to the early
Twentieth Century,9 although other avenues to provide faculty
job security can be seen as far back as the European

4
Walter Metzger, Academic Tenure in America: A Historical Essay, in
FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION ON
ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION 148–49 (London: GB: Jossey-Bass, Ltd.,
Publishers 1973) EDUCATION (London: GB: Jossey-Bass, Ltd., Publishers, 1973).
5
Id.
6
History of the AAUP, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS,
(Nov. 6, 2013, 9:21 AM), http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/about/history.
7
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (This decision established that
speech related to an employee’s daily work did not receive 1st Amendment protection).
8 Id.
9
Melanie Peterson, Academic Tenure and Higher Education in the United
States: Implications for the Dental Education Workforce in the Twenty-First Century,
71:3 JOURNAL OF DENTAL EDUCATION, 355 (2007).
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universities of the Twelfth Century.10 Prior to the arrival of
tenure in American universities, faculty in higher education
were retained in their positions on informal yearly contracts.11
These contracts were referred to as “gentlemen’s agreements”
because they were between gentlemen who were predominately
the university administration and the professor.12 Contracts
such as these placed a faculty member’s continuation of
employment at the whim of the university administration or
wealthy donors who funded various aspects of the university.13
This collegial arrangement changed, however, in the early part
of the Twentieth Century when Edward Ross, a Stanford
University professor, was summarily terminated for publicly
taking stand on issues deemed unacceptable by the wife of
Stanford’s founder.14 Ross’s termination is seen as a catalyst
for the formation of the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP), an organization based on a fundamental
tenet that formalized tenure and academic freedom among
faculty in higher education.15
With ever increasing demands for productivity and
scholarship coming from moneyed benefactors and external
political forces placed on faculty, as well as university
administrators terminating faculty for not adhering to
university religious or political beliefs, the AAUP sought to
codify its position on job security/tenure during its initial
meeting in 1915.16 The original position taken by this
Metzger, supra note 4, at 94.
Peterson, supra note 9, at 355.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
William Tierney and Estela Bensimon, Promotion and Tenure: Community
and Socialization in Academe 23 (1996) (Ross spoke out publicly against several
controversial topics of the time: 1) municipal ownership of public utilities; 2) his public
support for railway union strikes; and 3) how the use of Asian laborers instead of the
European-American working class was destructive for the United States working
classes’ wellbeing. Ross’s statements went directly against the business practices of
Leland Stanford, the founder of Stanford University. When Stanford’s widow learned
of his statements, she demanded Ross’s immediate termination. The university
president adhered to her demand and Ross was terminated because of his views on
immigrant labor and train monopolies).
15
Id.
16
Metzger, supra note 4, at 135–36 (There were two goals that the AAUP had
when drafting its 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure. These goals were: 1) to provide a means for protecting a faculty members
academic freedom in and outside of the classroom; and 2) to provide a safeguard for
faculty to perform other duties, such as research, without fear of reprimand from
university administration).
10
11
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association on tenure and academic freedom included a tenyear probationary period, during which time new faculty were
to have annual reviews to determine their so-called fit with
university life.17 Areas considered essential to university life
for faculty, and therefore under yearly review, included the
faculty member’s proficiency in three distinct components
related to academic life.18 These areas remain the foundation
for tenure decisions and address: teaching/providing quality
instruction; service to the university and community as a
whole; and scholarly research/publications which are often
further delineated depending on the discipline.19
Initially, many higher education institutions did not comply
with the AAUP’s recommendations on tenure;20 however, in
1940, the association revised its tenure position and
recommended that the probationary period be reduced from ten
years to seven years.21 Following the end of World War II,
university enrollments began to swell with returning veterans
entering higher education, spurred by financial assistance

17
1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure,
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 300 (Dec. 13, 2013, 11:29 PM),
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1915.htm (In the AAUP’s 1915
Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, the organization
stated their position on principles and clarified concepts on the topic of academic
freedom and tenure. According to the AAUP, academic freedom is essential to quality
research and instruction and should be awarded to all academic professionals.
Similarly, academic tenure is a “means to an end” and is essential to the safeguarding
of academic freedom).
18
Id.
19
Faculty Appointment, Salary, Promotion, and Tenure Policies, ILLINOIS
STATE
UNIVERSITY,
32–34
(Nov.
27,
2013
4:35
PM),
http://provost.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/aspt/ASPTmasterAugust2011.pdf.
(An
example of the components needed for promotion and tenure is seen in Illinois State
University’s policy for promotion).
20
According to Roger Geiger in Perspectives on the History of Higher Education
(2008), many universities throughout the country failed to implement the AAUP’s
recommendation for a 10 year probationary period due to the fact that there was no
agreement for a set probationary period between the two leading teacher unions at the
time, the AAUP and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). The AAUP in its
1915 Declaration recommended a ten year probation period for newly hired faculty
members. The other leading teacher union, the AFT, promoted a three year probation
period for all newly hired teachers.
21
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION
OF
UNIVERSITY
PROFESSORS,
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940statement.htm (Nov. 6,
2013, 10:10 PM) (Additionally, with the release of the 1940 Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure, academic tenure and academic freedom were identified
as being inseparable and vital to the instruction provided by faculty within academia).
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provided through the Montgomery GI Bill.22 Universities
looked for incentives to retain existing faculty as well as
inducements for new faculty. At this point, institutions of
higher education began to view tenure as a benefit of
employment and therefore implemented the AAUP’s
recommendation for acquiring tenure following a seven-year
probationary period.23
As universities moved forward based on the AAUP
recommendations, the probationary period gave administration
an opportunity to determine how the faculty member
interacted with students and peers and provided the
administration time to evaluate the value of the individual to
the university. Even though newly hired faculty were given
the opportunity for tenure, university administrators found
that if non-tenured faculty were not awarded tenure, they
could then seek legal recourse to challenge the administration’s
decision.24 Attempts to have the courts reverse university
tenure decisions have primarily been unsuccessful due to
various state and university policies adopted for the acquisition
of tenure.
Because the path to tenure has a professor undergo periodic
review of three components deemed essential for success in
university life as well as a probationary period of seven years,
universities have found it difficult and costly to dismiss an
instructor once tenure has been granted. Today, with tenure
and academic freedom firmly in place at most institutions of
higher education, questions concerning the legal relevance of
these concepts within the court system have been raised as
faculty bring legal proceedings against their institutions for
their dismissal regardless of if tenure has been granted.
III. A REVIEW OF GARCETTI (GARCETTI V. CEBALLOS – 2006)
Although Garceti does not directly address higher
education, the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision affect academia.25 University administrations utilize
Also known as the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944.
Kathryn Moore, Introduction: Academic Tenure in the United States, C. & U.
PERS. ASS’N J., Fall–Winter 1980, at 1, 4–5.
24
PHILIP ALTBACH, ET AL., AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2011).
25
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 US 410, 425 (2006).
22
23
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the Court’s ruling in determining a professor’s right to
academic freedom. Richard Ceballos was employed by the Los
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office as a Deputy District
Attorney in 1989.26
In 1998, Ceballos was promoted to
calendar deputy27 in the Pomona branch of the District
Attorney’s office.28 While working at the branch office, Ceballos
was approached by Richard Escobedo, a criminal defense
attorney representing a defendant who was charged through
the Pomona branch office (at the time, Ceballos was one of the
deputy district attorney’s working on People v. Cuskey [2000]).29
While in a conversation with Ceballos, Escobedo expressed his
belief that one of the deputies that had arrested his client lied
in the search warrant affidavit and requested that Ceballos
review the case.30 After reviewing the case file and visiting the
scene of the crime, Ceballos determined that the deputy sheriff
in question had grossly misrepresented the facts in the case.31
Upon arriving at his determination, Ceballos took his
findings to his supervisor (Carol Najera) and the Head Deputy
District Attorney (Frank Sundstedt) for the county.32 After
meeting with both individuals, it was determined by all that
the evidence presented by the sheriff was questionable.33
Therefore, on March 2, 2000, Ceballos submitted a formal
memorandum to Sundstedt stating that the affidavit had been
falsified and recommended that the case be dismissed.34
When the memorandum from Ceballos was received by the
Head Deputy District Attorney, Sundstedt contacted Ceballos
and instructed him to reword his memorandum so that it was
not overly critical of the arresting sheriff.35 Following the
direction of the Head Deputy District Attorney, Ceballos
reworked his memorandum and resubmitted it to Sundstedt.
On March 9, 2000 a meeting was called with several
representatives from the sheriff’s department, the Head
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004).
A Calendar Deputy is a supervisory position that oversees other deputy
district attorneys.
28
Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1170.
29
Id. at 1171
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
26
27
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Deputy District Attorney, Najera and Ceballos to discuss the
concerns identified by Ceballos in his memorandum.36 At the
completion of this meeting, Sundstedt was still not convinced
that the charges should be dismissed and decided to proceed
with the case pending the outcome of a motion submitted by
Escobedo challenging the search warrant.37
After being made aware of Sundstedt’s decision to pursue
the case, Ceballos contacted Escobedo to inform him that he
believed the affidavit for the search warrant was falsified.38
Upon hearing Ceballos’ doubt regarding the validity of the
warrant, Escobedo decided to subpoena Ceballos to testify on
the legality of the search warrant affidavit.39 Following his
testimony at the hearing on the motion challenging the validity
of the search warrant affidavit, Ceballos was removed from the
prosecution team involved with the case against Escobedo’s
client.40 According to Ceballos, following his testimony in court
regarding the facts behind the awarding of the search warrant,
Garcetti (the District Attorney), Sundstedt and Najera
retaliated against him.41
Claiming that he had been subjected to adverse
employment actions, Ceballos filed a suit against Sundstedt
and Najera in their individual capacities and against Garcetti
in his individual and official capacities, requesting the court
find for him, his lost wages and injunctive relief.42 Responding
to the claims against them, the defendants petitioned the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California for summary judgment based on their Eleventh
Amendment rights.43 These rights were granted by the Court.44
Furthermore, the defendants claimed that the issues raised by
the plaintiff resulted from a staffing shortage and were in no
way retaliation for the memorandum that he had sent.45 Upon
being notified of the defendant’s claims that there was no
retaliation, Ceballos amended his complaint and resubmitted it
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1171–72.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to the Court, noting that his First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated when the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office retaliated against him for his use of speech as
protected by the First Amendment.46
The defendants responded to the plaintiff’s claims alleging
that they should be granted summary judgment based on their
qualified immunity.47
To support their claim, Garcetti,
Sundstedt and Najera argued that: “1) . . .[p]laintiff’s speech
(the March 2, 2000 memorandum) was not protected by the
First Amendment; 2) even if the Court finds such speech was
protected, the right violated was not ‘clearly established’; and
3) the defendants’ actions were reasonable under the
circumstances.”48 In its ruling, the United States District Court
for the Central District of California stated that Ceballos’s
claim of First Amendment protection for his March 2, 2000
memorandum was unsupported by evidence, and that because
the speech in question was not a matter of public concern, as
defined in Connick,49 the defendant’s request for summary
judgment was awarded.50
Upon receiving the verdict from the District Court, Ceballos
decided to challenge the decision of the Court and submitted an
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.51 In his appeal, Ceballos alleged that his use of
protected speech in the March 2, 2000 memorandum resulted
in being subjected to adverse employment actions by Garcetti,
Sundstedt and Najera.52 Additionally, Ceballos argued that the
District Court erred when it awarded the defendants the right
to qualified immunity.53 Citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) in
his defense, Ceballos stated that for a public official to receive
qualified immunity, the person must have acted in a manner
that did not violate “clearly established . . . constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”54
See id.
Id.
48
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002).
49
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (The US Supreme Court indicated that
for an employee’s speech to be considered a matter of public concern, the speech had to
address issues relating to political, social, or other concerns to the community).
50
Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039.
51
See Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1170.
52
Id.
53
See id.
54
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
46
47
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During the Ninth Circuit’s examination of the evidence, it
identified that, for the purpose of summary judgment, qualified
immunity was not available to the state or county officials
because Ceballos’s speech was considered a matter of public
concern and, as such, was protected by the First Amendment.55
Furthermore, the Court identified that “. . .[because] the
Eleventh Amendment does not apply to political subdivisions of
the state, the county could ordinarily not assert sovereign
immunity, although in this case it could do so if such immunity
applied to the District Attorney.”56 However, regarding the
District Attorney’s ability to receive protection under sovereign
immunity, the Court noted that because Garcetti’s actions were
not deemed as the function of the state or county, he was
disqualified from receiving protection from the Eleventh
Amendment.57
The Court addressed Ceballos’ claim of protected speech by
referencing the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Connick, noting
that when an employee discusses matters of a personal nature
in the workplace, such as soliciting an individual’s colleagues to
determine their perception of topics to promote a personal
interest, the employee’s speech is not protected by the First
Amendment.58 The Court further referenced Connick when it
addressed the matter of an employee’s use of speech to discuss
“the issue of whether assistant district attorneys are pressured
to work in political campaigns is a matter of interest to the
community upon which it is essential that public employees be
able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”59
Reversing the lower court’s decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further
proceedings.60
Upon learning of the Court of Appeals ruling, Garcetti
submitted an appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
Following the conclusion of the arguments in the case, the
Supreme Court issued its ruling in which it stated that:
1) When public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, such employees are not speaking as private
55
56
57
58
59
60

Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1174.
Id. at 1170.
Id.
See id. at 1173–74
Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1185.
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citizens for First Amendment purposes, and thus the First
Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline of such
employees for such speech; 2) This result was consistent with
the Supreme Court’s precedents to the effect that government
employees who make public statements outside the course of
performing official duties retain some possibility of First
Amendment protection; 3) This holding likewise was supported
by the emphasis of the Supreme Court’s precedents on
affording government employers sufficient discretion to
manage their operations; 4) A contrary rule would commit
state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive
role involving judicial oversight of communications among
government employees and their superiors in the course of
official business; 5) The deputy’s allegation of unconstitutional
retaliation failed, for the deputy had spoken, a) not as a
private citizen and b) pursuant to his official duties as a
prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor
about how best to proceed with a pending case.61
The Court further explained that similar to Pickering, the
Court faces the challenge of trying to provide a balance
between an individual commenting upon a matter of public
concern and the State, as an employer, providing a service to
the public through its employees.62 According to the Court, and
referencing their decision in Pickering, it stated:
[In circumstances where] a teacher has made erroneous
public statements upon issues then currently the subject of
public attention, which are critical of his ultimate employer
but which are neither shown nor can be presumed to have in
any way either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of
his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with
the regular operation of the schools generally. . . . [T]he
interest of the school administration in limiting teachers’
opportunities to contribute to public debate is not
significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar
contribution by any member of the general public.63

As a result of their decision in Pickering, the Court
developed a three step approach for courts to use when
determining what constitutional protections can be awarded to
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
Id. at 416.
63
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., 391 U.S.
563, 572–573 (1968).
61
62
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a public employee’s speech.64 First, the court must determine if
the individual’s speech is considered a matter of public
concern.65 If the answer to this question is yes, then the
individual’s speech is awarded the protection of the First
Amendment; however, if the answer to the question is no, then
the individual has no claim against his/her employer for the
employer’s reaction based on the individual’s speech.66
Similarly, in the case of Garcetti, the government as an
employer has the discretion to restrict an employee’s speech,
but when doing so, the employing agency must be certain that
the restrictions imposed on the individual’s speech are in
response to the individual’s speech and how that speech could
negatively affect the individual’s work performance and thus,
the organization’s ability to perform.67
The Court continued in its ruling by referencing Waters v.
Churchill.68
In that case the Court stated that “[T]he
government as employer indeed has far broader powers than
does the government as sovereign”69 and as such
“. . .[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and
actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient
provision of public services.”70 Applying their statement from
Waters to Garcetti, the Court stated that as a result of Ceballos’
submitting a memorandum to his supervisor, an action that
was identified as not being outside the realm of his
responsibilities as a calendar deputy, his speech used was not
that of a citizen but rather of an employee. As such, it was
classified as not a matter of public concern; therefore, the
protection of the First Amendment was not awarded.71
However, in the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case, the
Justices indicated that the “. . .expression related to academic
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this
Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 568
Id.
Id.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418.
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
Id. at 671.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 418.
Id. at 423.
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not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we
conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”72
Furthermore, in support of the rights awarded to an academic’s
freedom of speech in the classroom, the Court referred to
Keyishian in which it had stated that “. . .[o]ur Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom.”73 The decision handed down
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Garcetti reversed the Court of
Appeals decision and remanded the case back to the lower
court for further proceedings.
The question of an employee’s speech and the protection it
is guaranteed by the First Amendment becomes a key element
raised within Garcetti.74 In the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling,
the Court reasoned that when an employee uses speech in
his/her daily job, and that speech is considered to be within the
realm of that individual’s responsibility, his/her speech is not
considered a matter of public concern, and does not receive the
protection of the First Amendment. However, even though the
Court identified work related speech as being outside the realm
of the protection of the First Amendment, the Court did
indicate that the decision reached in Garcetti did not imperil
the First Amendment protection awarded to educators in public
institutions of higher learning.75
IV. GARCETTI REFERENCED IN HIGHER EDUCATION CASES
A.

Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina –
Wilmington (2011)

One case in which a lower court referred to the application
of Garcetti in higher education is that of Adams v. Trustees of
the University of North Carolina-Wilmington (2011).76 In this

72
73

Id. at 425.
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603

(1967).
74
75
76

See Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410–26.
Id. at 425.
640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011).
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case, Adams was employed as an assistant professor at the
University of North Carolina, Wilmington Campus in the
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice.77 During his
probationary period Adams received high teaching evaluations
from his supervisor and students, received two faculty awards,
had articles published and was an active participant in
university related service activities.78 Upon the completion of
his probationary period, without question from his peers and
university administration, Adams received tenure and the new
academic rank of associate professor.
Several years after his promotion, Adams changed his
religious beliefs and became a conservative Christian, a change
that redefined his moral and ideological views.79 As his
religious beliefs grew stronger, he became increasingly vocal
about his views on the moral and political state of the
university and nation.80 In 2004, he published a book entitled,
“Welcome to the Ivory Tower of Babel: Confessions of a
Conservative College Professor” which contained past articles
as well as new works he had written.81 Although his views on
the moral well-being of the nation had changed, his ability to
be an effective teacher had not, and he continued to receive
positive reviews from his supervisor and students.82
Over the years, Adams became even more vocal in his views
and tension developed between him and several of his
colleagues. As these tensions mounted, complaints concerning
his public beliefs and values from the Board of Trustees and
the surrounding community began to find their way to the
university administration.83
However, even though the
university administration did not support Adams’ views or the
way he presented them to the public, they recognized his right
to freedom of speech and academic freedom and agreed that he
was able to express his thoughts without the fear of retaliation
from the administration.
Several months after publishing his book, Adams submitted
his application for promotion to full professor. According to the

77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 553.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 554
Id.
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Faculty Handbook at the University of North CarolinaWilmington, faculty promotion is reviewed in four areas: 1)
teaching ability; 2) research conducted or artistic achievement;
3) service to the university and community, and 4) scholarship
and professional development completed.84 In addition to these
four areas, the review process for promotion placed an
emphasis on the significance of teaching excellence and
research conducted or artistic achievement attained, items that
carry the most weight in the decision process for the awarding
of promotion and tenure.85 Adams included all of the required
documents in his application packet plus a list of his published
and pending publications, including the Welcome to the Ivory
Tower of Babel: Confessions of a Conservative College
Professor.86
After completing his application for promotion, Adams
submitted his packet to the department chairperson, Dr.
Kimberly Cook.87 Following promotion guidelines identified
within the Faculty Handbook, Cook forwarded Adams’ packet
to the senior most department faculty members requesting
their feedback on Adams’ request for promotion.88 Upon
receiving the recommendation from the senior faculty
members, Cook compiled their responses and placed them in a
document that summarized the overall themes of the comments
submitted by the senior faculty.89 Cook then called a meeting
with the senior faculty members to discuss their comments and
recommendations.90 During this meeting, the scholarly works
Adams had submitted were evaluated for their scholarly
content.91 According to those who participated in the meeting,
the scholarly work was difficult to review because “they were
not peer-reviewed or traditional academic writing related to his
academic discipline.”92 As a result, the department denied
Adams’ request for promotion.93
84
Faculty Handbook, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA- WILMINGTON, (2013),
available at, http://uncw.edu/facsen/documents/2012_Faculty_Handbook.pdf.
85
Adams, 640 F.3d at 556.
86
Id.
87 Id. at 555
88
Id.
89 Id.
90
Id.
91 Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
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Upon receiving notification of denial for his promotion,
Adams requested a written response from the department
chair identifying the reasons for the denial of his promotion.94
In her response to Adams, Cook explained that the decision
. . .was based exclusively on the promotion application and
supplementary materials [that he had] submitted and [with
Cook’s] consultation with the senior faculty in accordance
with existing UNCW . . . policies and procedures. [Cook]
indicated an overwhelming consensus of the senior faculty did
not support the promotion and found the lack of support from
the senior faculty provided compelling evidence that Adams’
record [did] not merit promotion to professor at [that] time.95

Adams followed the receipt of Cook’s explanation by filing a
claim with the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina in which he stated that the
University of North Carolina – Wilmington had violated his
First Amendment rights and retaliated against him stating
that the university’s decision to deny him promotion was based
on his protected speech.96 Furthermore, Adams claimed that
he had been denied the constitutionally protected right to due
process.97
The defendants, who had been named in their individual
and official capacities, requested summary judgment in this
case and that the claims against them be dismissed in
accordance to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).98 After
granting the motion submitted by the defense, the District
Court referred to Garcetti where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that when a public employee is speaking in his official capacity,
he is not speaking as a citizen.99 In the Court’s decision in
Adams, they indicated that the focus of this case was not
placed on the speech itself, but the role of the speaker when it
was said.
Adams appealed the District Court’s decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In filing his

Id.
Id.
96 Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 556. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) calls for the dismissal of
charges if it appears to the court that the plaintiff cannot provide support to their
claims that would entitle them to relief.
99
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006).
94

95
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appeal, Adams submitted claims based on several actions
committed by the university: 1) the university had violated his
First Amendment rights by basing their decision for his
request of promotion on his protected speech; and 2) that the
university had violated his right to equal protection awarded
him under the Fourteenth Amendment.100
In deciding this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit indicated that the District Court erred in
granting summary judgment for the defendant on his First
Amendment claims.
However, basing their opinion on
Pickering and Garcetti, the Court further explained that “while
government employees do not lose their constitutional rights at
work, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
government may impose certain restraints on its employees’
speech and take action against them that would be
unconstitutional if applied to the general public.”101 In making
this point, the Court referenced their ruling in McVey v. Stacy
(1998), identifying the complexity between a public employee
acting as a citizen when the employee has commented on
matters of public concern and the ability of government acting
as an employer by providing a public service. In this case the
Court had to determine:
1) whether the public employee was speaking as a citizen
upon a matter of public concern or as an employee about a
matter of personal interest;
2) whether the employee’s interest in speaking upon the
matter of public concern outweighed the government’s
interest in providing effective and efficient services to the
public; or
3) whether the employee’s speech was a substantial factor in
the employee’s [adverse employment] decision.102

Referencing the McVey test, the U.S. Court of Appeals
stated that the District Court had erred when it had only
applied the first step of the test and identified that Adams had
spoken in his official capacity and not that of a citizen.103
Furthermore, the Court explained that the lower court had

Adams, 640 F.3d at 557.
Id. at 560.
102
McVey v. Stacy, 157 F 3d 271, 277–78 (4th Cir. 1998) (this three prong test is
known as the McVey test).
103
Adams, 640 F.3d at 561.
100
101
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misinterpreted Garcetti in several areas. According to the
Court, the District Court faltered when it: 1) held that
protected speech was converted to unprotected speech based on
its use after the fact; and 2) applied Garcetti without
acknowledging the language used within the Supreme Court’s
decision indicating that the Court’s analysis on freedom of
speech did not apply to education.104 Furthermore, the Appeals
Court stated that the District Court faltered when it concluded
that Adams’ speech, which had been protected by the First
Amendment, had turned into unprotected speech after the
speech had been made.105 In its decision, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling
on summary judgment on Adams’ First Amendment claims.106
The Court remanded the case back to the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina for further
proceedings.107
The Adams case challenged academic freedom.
The
Appeals Court’s ruling stated that “the underlying right Adams
asserts the Defendants violated — that of a public employee to
speak as a citizen on matters of public concern — is clearly
established and something a reasonable person in the
Defendants’ position should have known was protected.”108 The
purpose of academic freedom is to protect faculty members’
freedom of speech without the fear of reprimand from their
employer. Finally, in its decision, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stated, “we conclude Adams’ speech was clearly
that of a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern.
Adams’ columns addressed topics such as academic freedom,
civil rights, campus culture, sex, feminism, abortion,
homosexuality, religion, and morality. Such topics plainly
touched on issues of public, rather than private, concern.”109
B.

Demers v. Austin (2013)

Demars v. Austin is a recent case that references Garcetti
and is similar to Adams. In this case, David Demers, a tenured

104
105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 565.
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faculty member at Washington State University (WSU), was
employed within the University’s College of Liberal Arts.110
While performing his duties as a faculty member, Demers
distributed a controversial seven step plan calling for the
separation of the College’s communication school into two
different faculty groups, Mass Communication and
Communication Studies.111
A committee was eventually
formed (the Structure Committee) to research the feasibility for
separating the communication school (the Murrow School) into
two separate schools.112 Their resulting proposition created a
rift among those employed within the school of
communication.113
While serving as a member of the Structure Committee,
Demers proposed a plan (The Plan) defining seven reasons for
separating the school into two distinct departments and
submitted The Plan to the Provost of the University.114 After
waiting several months and receiving no feedback from the
Provost, Demers submitted his plan to his faculty colleagues,
the university administration, the advisory board for the
Murrow School and the President of the University.115 Shortly
after the dissemination of The Plan to the community at large,
the faculty at WSU began to receive questions from the public
related to Demers’s proposal.116
During the time relevant to The Plan being made available
to the public, Demers submitted his annual self-prepared
faculty evaluation report to the interim director of the Murrow
School, Dr. Erica Austin.117 As defined within WSU’s faculty
manual, each faculty member’s annual review should include
“a curriculum vitae that will include information concerning
education, instructional performance, research activities and
publications”118 Following these guidelines, Demers submitted
his report which included a book he had authored which
Demers v. Austin, 729 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir.,2013).
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1016.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
2012–2013 Faculty Manual 63, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY, available at
http://facsen.wsu.edu/faculty_manual/2013facman_updatedTOC061413a.pdf.
(A policy that is still evident in the most current version of the faculty manual).
110
111
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criticized academia and WSU entitled The Ivory Tower of
Babel.119
After receiving several negative annual evaluations from
the interim director (from 2006 to 2008), Demers submitted a
claim to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington alleging that the university
administration had retaliated against him for his publication of
The Plan and The Ivory Tower of Babel, claiming both were
protected under the First Amendment of the Constitution.120
In response to the claims made by the plaintiff, the
defendants claimed that the plaintiff’s negative yearly
evaluations were in response to Demers’ redirected priorities
away from the position for which he was hired in academia, his
lack of attendance at institutional committees, and the fact
that he frequently cancelled his classes – all of which violated
university policy.121 Furthermore, the defendants claimed that
with the decision reached in Garcetti by the U.S. Supreme
Court, Demers’s publications were pursuant to his official
duties at the university and should not be awarded First
Amendment protection.122 The District Court’s ruling “held that
[T]he Plan and Ivory Tower [of Babel] were written and
distributed in the performance of Demers’s official duties as a
faculty member of WSU, and were therefore not protected
under the First Amendment.”123
Demers appealed the District Court’s decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that: 1)
his publication of The Plan and the Ivory Tower of Babel were
not pursuant to his position at the university; and 2) even if the
publication of The Plan and the Ivory Tower of Babel were
pursuant to his official duties, the ruling in Garcetti did not
apply to faculty speech and academic writing.124
In deciding the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit first addressed Demers’s claim that his
publication of The Plan and the Ivory Tower of Babel were not
pursuant to his official duties at WSU. In their review of the
evidence, the Court stated that as Demers was “preparing
119
120
121
122
123
124

Demers, 729 F.3d at 1014.
Id.
Id. at 1017.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1017–18.
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[T]he [P]lan, [he] sent an email to his fellow faculty members
at the Murrow School, soliciting ideas and comments.”125
Furthermore, the Court identified that within his 2007 annual
self-prepared faculty report, Demers listed that he had
“[d]eveloped a 7-Step Plan for reorganizing the Murrow School
to improve the quality of the professional programs and attract
more developmental funds.”126 According to the Court:
it is impossible, as a real-world practical matter, to separate
Demers’s position as a member of the Mass Communication
faculty, and as a member of the Structure Committee, from
his preparation and distribution of his Plan. Furthermore, we
note that when it was to his advantage to do so, Demers
characterized his development of the Plan as part of his
official duties in his 2007 Annual Activities Report.127

However, basing their opinion on Garcetti, the Court
referenced U.S. Supreme Court Justice Souter when he stated,
“I have to hope that today’s majority does not mean to imperil
First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public
colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and
write ‘pursuant to. . .official duties.’”128 Referencing Keyishian
v. the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New
York (1967), as well as the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in Adams, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated that “teaching and academic writing are
at the core of the official duties of teachers and professors. Such
teaching and writing are ‘a special concern of the First
Amendment.’”129 In the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit’s final summation of the case presented before them,
the Court stated, “[w]e conclude that Garcetti does not –
indeed, consistent with the First Amendment, cannot – apply
to teaching and academic writing that are performed ‘pursuant
to the official duties’ of a teacher and professor. We hold that
academic employee speech not covered by Garcetti is protected
under the First Amendment, using the analysis established in
Pickering.”130
In Demers’ case, the concept of academic freedom was
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id.
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 438 (2006).
Demers, 729 F.3d at 1019.
Id. at 1020.
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challenged when a professor’s academic speech and writing
were linked in similar fashion to the definition of employee
speech identified within Garcetti. However, the Court’s ruling
stated that “protected academic writing is not confined to
scholarship. . .academics, in the course of their academic
duties, also write memoranda, reports, and other documents
addressed to things such as budget, curriculum, departmental
structure, and faculty hiring. [S]uch writing may well address
matters of public concern under Pickering.”131 The purpose of
academic freedom, one that is well supported within the U.S.
legal system, is to protect a faculty members’ freedom of speech
even if his/her actions are pursuant to their official duties at a
university. In its decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit stated that “[w]e hold that there is an exception to
Garcetti for teaching and academic writing.”132
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the protections awarded the professoriate through
academic freedom and freedom of speech were clearly
established in Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University
of the State of New York (1967), these principles are once again
being challenged within the U.S. legal system. As seen in the
two United States Court of Appeals’ cases discussed in this
article, the application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Garcetti has been erroneously applied towards a professor’s
academic writings and academic speech by university
administration and District Courts alike.
If Garcetti, and its categorical approach to defining
employee speech as an unprotected right of the First
Amendment, is applied in higher education without university
administration and the district courts first understanding the
Supreme Court’s meaning of employee speech and how it
applies within higher education, professors will receive little or
no protection from the disciplinary action of university
administrators for the professor’s use of speech and academic
writing that has been classified as being pursuant to their
official duties at their university.133 However, in most cases,
Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1025.
133
Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST
AMEND. LAW REV. 54, 56–57 (2008).
131
132
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university administrators do not act out against academic
freedom because of their disdain for it,134 but rather out of their
lack of an understanding of the protections awarded faculty for
their academic writings and academic speech.
With the decisions of the lower courts in these cases being
reversed by various U.S. Courts of Appeals (as seen in Adams
and Demers), the constitutionally protected rights of academics
for their academic speech and writing is being recognized as a
First Amendment protection. As social and political events
within higher education over the past several years have led
university administrators to question the parameters of
Constitutional protections and challenge the academic’s right
to freedom of speech, the U.S. legal system has remained firm
in its interpretation of the law by protecting a professor’s civil
rights as well as those rights awarded to their academic speech
and writings.135
Those working as professionals within higher education
need first to understand the Supreme Court’s ruling in Garcetti
prior to applying it as a way to regulate a faculty member’s
academic speech or writing. In Garcetti the Supreme Court
held that when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, such employees are not speaking as private
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and thus “the First
Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline of such
employees for such speech.”136 Unfortunately, simply taking
this statement and applying it to issues related to academic
freedom is where many university administrators have fallen
short. University administrators must not only recognize the
language, but also understand that Garcetti further defines a
professor’s freedom of speech. Within the Supreme Court’s
decision the Court states: “. . .expression related to academic
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this
Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need
not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we
conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case

134
Kevin Cope, Defending the Ivory Tower: A Twenty-First Century Approach to
the Pickering-Connick Doctrine and Public Higher Education Faculty after Garcetti, 33
J.C. & U.L. 313, 360 (2007).
135
Id.
136
Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 424.
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involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”137 As
evident from this review of the cases, the U.S. legal system
supports the issue of Freedom of Speech, i.e., academic
freedom, for those in education. This support is most notable
in the following passage from Keyishian: “. . .[o]ur Nation is
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.”138

137
138

(1967).

Id. at 425.
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603

